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Abstract
In recent years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have had a dramatic impact on a
variety of problems that were long considered very difficult, e. g., image classifica-
tion and automatic language translation to name just a few. The accuracy of mod-
ern DNNs in classification tasks is remarkable indeed. At the same time, attackers
have devised powerful methods to construct specially-crafted malicious inputs (of-
ten referred to as adversarial examples) that can trick DNNs into mis-classifying
them. What is worse is that despite the many defense mechanisms proposed to
protect DNNs against adversarial attacks, attackers are often able to circumvent
these defenses, rendering them useless. This state of affairs is extremely worrying,
especially since machine learning systems get adopted at scale.
In this paper, we propose a scientific evaluation methodology aimed at assessing
the quality, efficacy, robustness and efficiency of randomized defenses to protect
DNNs against adversarial examples. Using this methodology, we evaluate a va-
riety of defense mechanisms. In addition, we also propose a defense mechanism
we call Randomly Perturbed Ensemble Neural Networks (RPENNs). We provide
a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the considered defense mechanisms
against a white-box attacker model, six different adversarial attack methods and
using the ILSVRC2012 validation data set.
1 Introduction
Machine learning algorithms – especially Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) – have received consider-
able attention in recent years thanks to their ability in addressing long-standing difficult problems
in diverse areas such as computer vision Krizhevsky et al. [2012], speech recognition Hinton et al.
[2012], games Silver et al. [2016], and autonomous driving Bojarski et al. [2016], to name just a few.
Unfortunately, while neural network classifiers seem remarkably successful when applied within a
benign environment, they tend to fail spectacularly when confrontedwith so called adversarial exam-
ples (AEs). This was powerfully demonstrated in the work of Szegedy et al. Szegedy et al. [2013],
who were the first to show that neural network classifiers were vulnerable to adversarial inputs.1
Informally, given an input x for a neural network h, an adversarial example is an input x′ that is
indistinguishable from x for a human observer, but causes h to behave in an undesirable way, i. e.,
1 In this paper, we interchangeably use the terms inputs and examples.
Preprint. Under review.
different from how h behaves on x. (In Section 2, we precisely define many terms used informally
here.)
In the years since Szegedy et al.’s work was published, many methods to generate adversarial exam-
ples have been developed, often enabling the attacker to choose the particular way the targeted
network should misbehave Carlini and Wagner [2017b], Goodfellow et al. [2014], Kurakin et al.
[2016], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016], Papernot et al. [2016a], Szegedy et al. [2013]. Also, sev-
eral methods to defend against Gu and Rigazio [2014], Liao et al. [2018], Papernot et al. [2016c],
Tramèr et al. [2017], Xu et al. [2018], and methods to detect adversarial inputs, have been devel-
oped. For an overview see the paper Carlini and Wagner [2017a] by Carlini and Wagner. However,
many of these methods have been shown to be less effective than claimed, for example, by Carlini
and Wagner in Carlini and Wagner [2017a,c,b].
As Goodfellow et al. point out in Goodfellow et al. [2018], it is of great importance to make systems
incorporating machine learning software robust against adversarial examples, especially since it has
been shown by Kurakin et al. in Kurakin et al. [2016] and by Brown et al. in Brown et al. [2017]
that adversarial examples can be harmful in the physical world. For example, regarding the safety of
autonomous driving, Eykholt et al. have demonstrated in Eykholt et al. [2018] that real traffic signs
may be practically manipulated to be misinterpreted by image classification neural networks.
Problem Statement: To what extent are defense mechanisms (DMs), which utilize randomization,
able to defend DNNs against adversarial examples? In this paper we present a comprehensive
methodology to empirically evaluate (randomized) defense mechanisms. Using that methodology,
we answer the former question exemplarily, by investigating defense mechanisms which utilize ran-
domization. Two of them are proposed by Gu and Rigazio in Gu and Rigazio [2014], one of them
is an extension of their work which we will present and the last one is RPENN – a novel defense
mechanism we introduce in this work.
Contributions: In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. Evaluation Methodology for NN Defense Mechanisms: Our most important contribu-
tion is an evaluation methodology that enables us to assess defense mechanisms over a
set metrics and associated properties such as efficacy, quality, robustness and efficiency
(see Section 3). We compare several DMs along these metrics. More specifically, us-
ing the Taxonomy given by Papernot et al. Papernot et al. [2016b], we define a precise
threat model (see Section 2). Based on that model, we reason about properties which
enable a defense mechanism be effective against such attackers. We then derive nat-
ural metrics to measure and compare those properties across defense mechanisms (re-
fer to Section 3). To make our results robust, we evaluate on the real world sized
VGG19 Simonyan and Zisserman [2014] deep neural network, the large and popular valida-
tion data set ILSVRC2012 Deng et al. [2009]2 and six different methods Goodfellow et al.
[2014], Kurakin et al. [2016], Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016], Papernot et al. [2016a] to
generate adversarial examples (the L-BFGS attack Szegedy et al. [2013] and the Carlini
Wagner ℓ2 attack Carlini and Wagner [2017b] are among them).
Further, in order to make our experiments comprehensible and to enable other researchers
to repeat them, we carefully describe the execution of our evaluation by covering prepro-
cessing, adversarial example generation, metric estimation, and the choice of DM param-
eters. We also publish our implementation of the considered defense mechanisms and the
benchmark utilities at GitHub.3 Finally, our methodology conforms with the suggestions
given by Carlini and Wagner in Carlini and Wagner [2017a].
2. Randomly Perturbed Ensemble Neural Networks: We also propose a randomized de-
fense mechanism, called Randomly Perturbed Ensemble Neural Networks (RPENNs), that
generates from a trained neural network h several randomized variations – a randomized
ensemble – which are then used for inference instead of the original network. For a detailed
description of RPENN, see Section 4.
2In case the reader wonders why we use the data set from 2012: It was introduced in that year and reused
up to 2017.
3 See https://github.com/ypotdevin/randomized-defenses.
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3. Evaluation and extensions of DMs proposed by Gu and Rigazio: Among the first mech-
anisms proposed to defend against adversarial examples were the L1 and L* defense mech-
anism by Gu and Rigazio Gu and Rigazio [2014]. The key feature of L1 is to inject noise
into the input of a DNN, before inferring it. In L* the noise is additionally injected into
the hidden layer of a DNN, before inferring the input. As a natural extension of Gu and
Rigazio’s work, we introduce L+, were the noise is only injected into the hidden layers
before inferring the input. We evaluate the three DMs way more extensively than was done
previously in the literature.
4. Important Findings: In addition to developing a robust methodology for evaluating ran-
domized DMs, we make several surprising findings. As mentioned above, we evaluated 4
different DMs, namely, L1, L*, L+, and RPENN. Of these, L1 is the simplest, since it only
perturbs the input layer. To our surprise, L1 performed best against the other DMs on the
properties we tested, namely, efficacy, quality, robustness, and efficiency.
Besides the above mentioned properties, an often overlooked aspect of DMs is whether they are
cost-effective to deploy, a property we call deployability. While this property is hard to define
mathematically, it is nonetheless very important to consider in practical settings. For example, in
traditional computer security context, many DMs can be easily deployed via a software patching
mechanism over the internet. Fortunately, all DMs discussed in this paper also share this »ease of
deployment« property, and any deployed DNN can be easily patched with the DMs we study. (We
shall not discuss this property any further in this paper.)
Structure of the Paper: The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide
definitions for concepts such as adversarial examples/attacks, defense mechanism (DM), and a threat
model (Subsection 2). In Section 3, we define the notion and properties of good defense mechanisms.
In Section 4, we describe the various DMs considered in this paper, including the ones we introduced,
namely, RPENN and L+. In Section 5, we describe our experimental methodology, followed by
results in Section 6. In Section 7, we compare our work to previous work. In Section 8, we discuss
possible weaknesses of our experimental approach and steps we took to mitigate them. Finally, we
conclude in Section 9.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we define many terms used throughout the paper. Wherever appropriate, we make
definitions mathematically precise. Given that the field of ML security is still in its infancy, many
terms are only informally defined.
Deep Neural Networks For the sake of completeness, we provide a brief definition of deep neural
networks (DNNs), specifically focusing on those that perform image classification tasks, i. e., clas-
sifiers. More precisely, we model images to be real valued vectors of a domainD ⊆ Ri, class labels
to be integers in { 1, . . . , j }, where j is the number of different classes considered, and a classifier
to be a function h : D → { 1, . . . , j }.
Adversarial Examples: Given an image x ∈ D which is correctly classified by a classifier h,
an adversarial example is an image x′ ∈ D such that h(x) 6= h(x′) and sim(x, x′) is low, where
sim: Ri × Ri → R≥0 is a suitable4 metric capturing the similarity between the images x and x′.
As an example, let x ∈ D be an image correctly classified by h as a Panda. Then an adversarial
example is an image x′ ∈ D, where only some pixels differ slightly from the respective pixels in x
(a human would still classify x′ as a Panda, probably one would not even see a difference between
x and x′), but h(x′) is the class for images of Gibbons.
Defense Mechanism: By defense mechanisms we mean a function (or from the practical point
of view: a computer program) d taking a classifier h as input and yielding a classifier as output
4 Often, for simplicity, the Euclidean distance, the Chebyshev distance or the ℓ0-“norm” are chosen as a
metric. It is debatable whether these choices truly capture similarity between images. However, in practice they
mostly yield satisfying results.
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d(h), which is of the same domain and codomain as the input classifier. Instead of d(h), we use the
notation h+ d throughout this paper. We may parameterize a randomized defense mechanism, like
RPENN, additionally by its random seed σ denoted by dσ . When the context is clear or the seed
variable is not essential for the presentation, we omit the σ and just write d.
Installation: By the term installation of a classifier h (which specifically includes classifiers pro-
tected by a DM), we refer to copy of a computer program realizing h on a device. This term has
the same connotation as the installation of an operating system on a desktop computer. We point
out that realizing a classifier h may include providing additional information to it, which are highly
depending on (the state of) the ambient device (like a random seed for example). This way one in-
stallation realizing h might show different input output behavior than another installation realizing
h.
Threat Model
Following the taxonomy given in Papernot et al. Papernot et al. [2016b], a threat or attacker model
suitable for ML systems consists of three main components:
1. Attack surface (the parts of the ML system that an attacker can access and manipulate)
2. Adversarial capabilities (the actions and information an attacker may use)
3. Adversarial goals (what an adversary tries to achieve)
We use this relatively informal threat model, walking through the three main components of it, to
describe both the capabilities and limitations of an attacker.
Attack Surface: The parts of the attack surface of a machine learning system which the attacker
may attack in the inference phase are: the physical input domain (objects, actions), the digital rep-
resentation (bits) of the relevant subset of the physical domain, the hardware involved in generating
that digital representation (sensors, cameras, IO hardware), the machine learning model, its input
features and the procedure of preprocessing the digital representation to those features.
Adversarial Capabilities: The attacker is capable of manipulating the input features of the ML
systems. The attacker may achieve this by directly accessing them, or by modifying any previous
stage – the preprocessing procedure, the digital representation, the sensors or the physical objects.
Additionally, the attacker has white box read access to the machine learning model itself, including
its architecture and its weights. The attacker or adversary may not attack any of the following: any
part or the entirety of the training process, the application of the machine learning model and its
outputs, the output analysis, the actions taken based on the outputs, and most importantly: the seeds
used to realize the randomization.
Adversarial Goals: The goal of the adversary is to attack the integrity and availability of the ML
system, by forcing theML system to (mis)classify in his favor. For example, the attacker may bypass
biometric access control systems or he may force autonomous cars to skip stop signs. However, the
attacker may not violate confidentiality or privacy properties of the ML system under attack.
3 Properties of Good Defense Mechanisms
Here we articulate a set of properties that we believe all good defense mechanisms must possess.
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any other effort at articulating explicitly such
properties of ML defense mechanisms. We also characterize how these properties can be evaluated
experimentally.5
5 It has to be noted that since ML security research is still in its infancy, we are far from mathematically
proving that any DMs possess said good properties. We are, at this stage, limited to performing empirical
evaluation of proposed DMs within the context of mathematically defined metrics, chosen data sets, fixed
attack models, as well as the kinds of DNNs being protected. Hence, it goes without saying that all empirical
conclusions are contingent on these choices. Having said that, we still take great pains here to define these
properties as crisply as possible such that it enables us to make precise measurements, analyses, and appropriate
comparisons.
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Efficacy: Informally, we say that a DM d is effective, if the accuracy of h+d on adversarial inputs
is higher than the accuracy of h. The metric we use to measure efficacy of a DM d is the natural
one of taking the ratio of the number of correctly classified adversarial inputs over the total number
of adversarial inputs. Ideally, we want our DMs to simultaneously protect the input DNN from
adversarial inputs as well as maintaining (or improving) its accuracy on benign inputs.
Quality: Informally, we say that a defense mechanism d is of high quality, if h+ d has similar or
better accuracy than h on benign inputs.
Robustness: Informally, we say that a defense mechanism d is robust, if any single adversarial
example is only misclassified by a small fraction of the installations of h+ d. This is similar to the
diversity property of certain randomization-based defense mechanisms used in the context of system
security, e. g., Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR).
Efficiency: Informally, we say that a defense mechanism d is efficient, if applying h+d introduces
just constant overhead regarding running time and space requirements, compared to applying just h.
Metrics to Quantify Properties of Defense Mechanisms
Here we mathematically define the metrics used to quantify the above-mentioned properties of de-
fense mechanisms. Let S := (D × { 1, . . . , j })∗ denote the set of finite sequences of pairs, where
the left components are images and the right components are class labels. Let S ∈ S be a sequence
of images and their corresponding true labels and h be a classifier. We denote by h(S) the sequence
of labels h predicts for the images in S. By Ah(S) ∈ S we denote a sequence of adversarial exam-
ples an attackerA derived from S to attack h. The class labels in Ah(S) are A’s target labels, those
labels which are different from the ones in S and whichA desires to match with h(Ah(S)). For any
label sequence L we define byM (L, S) := |{ i | Li = (Si)2 }| the number of matching labels of L
and S (note that the subscript 2 in (Si)2 indicates the right component of the pair Si).
Now we are able to define metrics to compare defense mechanisms regarding several properties.
Efficacy Metric: We evaluate the ability of a defense mechanism d to block adversarial examples
with respect to 1) a classifier to protect h, 2) an adversarial example generation method A and 3) a
test sequence S whichA used to derive adversarial examples from. Having fixed these, we measure
d’s efficacy by
Eh,A,S(d) :=
M ((h+ d)(Ah(S)), S)
|Ah(S)|
.
That is the amount of adversarial examples classified correctly (regarding their ground truth) divided
by the total amount of adversarial examples. One could also say this is the Top-1 accuracy of h+ d
on the adversarial examples sequence.
Quality Metric: Using the same prerequisites as for the efficacy metric, disregarding the presence
of an attacker, we measure d’s quality by
Qh,S(d) :=
M ((h+ d)(S), S)
|S|
.
This is simply the Top-1 accuracy of h+ d on the test sequence S.
Robustness Metric: Adding to the prerequisites needed to define the efficacy metric, let
σ1, σ2, . . . be a sequence of random seeds and dσ1 , dσ2 , . . . be a sequence of installations of a ran-
domized defense mechanism d. The robustness of a defense mechanism is measured, with respect
to a number of installations n and a robustness level q ∈ R, 0 < q ≤ 1, by
Rh,A,S(d, q, n) :=
|{Ai |M (〈Li,1, . . . , Li,n〉, 〈Ai, . . . , Ai〉) ≥ ⌊q · n⌋ }|
|Ah(S)|
,
where A is a shorthand forAh(S) and L := 〈(h+ dσ1 )(A)
T , . . . , (h+ dσn)(A)
T 〉 is a label matrix
combining as columns the predicted class label sequences of the n installations (with their seeds)
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for the adversarial inputs A. In the enumerator only those adversarial inputs are counted, which
are misclassified as intended by at least ⌊q · n⌋ out of n installations of d. Thus the robustness
metric estimates the attacker’s chance of corrupting at least a q-fraction of n installations. For any
robustness level q it is desirable thatRh,A,S(d, q, n) approaches 0 considerably fast, as n increases.
When it is clear from the context, we omit the indices h, A, S from the metrics (and regarding R
even d) to give a more crisp presentation.
4 Randomized Defense Mechanisms
In this section we describe the noise injection defense mechanisms proposed by Gu and Rigazio
in Gu and Rigazio [2014], which they denoted »L1« and »L*«. We also introduce a natural exten-
sion of their work, which we will call »L+«. This section ends with the introduction our defense
mechanism: RPENN.
The L1 defense mechanism
Since Gu and Rigazio did not publish a reference implementation, we had to reimplement their
mechanisms in order to assess them. In [Gu and Rigazio, 2014, Section 3.1], Gu and Rigazio de-
scribe their two defense mechanisms only roughly, stating that the noise is added to layers – not
clarifying if the noise is added to the weights of the layers, to the input of their activation functions,
to the output of their activation functions, or any combination of those. We decided to interpret Gu
and Rigazio’s description as adding noise to the weights, because it is easy to implement and also
more comparable to our defense mechanism (which we will explain below). We make an exception
to that rule regarding the input layer, since that layer has no weights (and no activation function). In
that case, we add the noise directly to the input.
The core idea behind the L1 defense mechanism is to perturb the input of a DNN with noise, hoping
that this way the adversarial manipulation of the input is neutralized and the ground truth restored.
The amount of noise which will be injected is controlled by the parameter σ ∈ R>0. In more detail:
1. Read the input x = 〈x1, . . . , xi〉 of a DNN h.
2. Draw independently i random samples ǫ1, . . . , ǫi from the Gaussian distributionN
(
0, σ2
)
.
3. With x′ := 〈x1 + ǫ1, . . . , xi + ǫi〉, return y = h(x′).
The L* defense mechanism
In the L* defense mechanism the idea of noise injection is taken to the next level, by perturbing
additionally the weights of the DNN. In more detail:
1. Read the input x = 〈x1, . . . , xi〉 of a DNN h, with weights w1, w2, . . . , wk .
2. Draw independently i+ k random samples
ǫ1, . . . , ǫi, ǫi+1, . . . , ǫi+k
from the Gaussian distributionN
(
0, σ2
)
.
3. Replace the weights w1, w2, . . . , wk of h by
w1 + ǫi+1, w2 + ǫi+2, . . . , wk + ǫi+k.
4. With x′ := 〈x1 + ǫ1, . . . , xi + ǫi〉, return y = h(x′).
Note that Gu and Rigazio only expose the parameter σ in their description of L1 and L*. This is
why we assume that the noise aiming at the input is drawn from the same distribution as the noise
aiming at the weights of the hidden layers is drawn from.
The L+ defense mechanism
To see what effect perturbing the weights of the hidden layers without perturbing the input would
have, we also implemented a DM we call L+, which is essentially L* minus L1. In more detail:
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1. Read the input x of a DNN h, with weights w1, w2, . . . , wk.
2. Draw independently k random samples ǫ1, . . . , ǫk from the Gaussian distribution
N
(
0, σ2
)
.
3. Replace the weights w1, w2, . . . , wk of h by
w1 + ǫ1, w2 + ǫ2, . . . , wk + ǫk.
4. Return y = h(x).
One could also understand L* as L1 plus L+ which is, in our opinion, a more suitable point of view,
since we rate editing the input of a DNN to be conceptually different from editing the DNN itself.
When Gu and Rigazio introduced L1 and L*, we argue that they presented two different concepts,
one is given by L1 and the other is partially hidden in L*. We make that hidden concept explicit by
presenting L+.
The RPENN defense mechanism
In this section, we describe our own defense mechanism to protect deep neural networks from adver-
sarial examples: Randomly Perturbed Ensemble Neural Networks (RPENNs). Informally, we take
a trained DNN h, generatem copies of it, and randomly perturb the weights of each copy. We then
compose these DNNs into an ensemble via majority voting.
The key insight that led us to developing our defense mechanism is the following: If adversarial
examples are hard to distinguish from their benign twins for the human viewer, how come that DNNs
come to high confidence mis-classifications? Is it because there are very sensitive (combinations of)
units in the network reacting to the tiniest change of their input? Do adversarial example generation
methods rely on the very setting of these sensitive units to exploit them? If so, maybe it would help
to reduce the sensitivity of those units by manipulating their weights a little and therefore changing
the setting the attacker relied on.
Guided by the assumption stated above, we developed a defense mechanism which takes a trained
DNN h (ready for production use), copies its weights (and biases) and generates, based on the
copied weights, randomized variations h1, h2, . . . hm which are similar to h, but not equal (with a
high probability). Then the inputs predetermined for h are fed to h1, h2, . . . hm instead, processed
by them, and their respective outputs are combined to a new final result. In more detail:
1. Read the input x of a DNN h, with weights w1, w2, . . . , wk.
2. Draw independently new weights
w11 ∼ N
(
w1, (λ · w1)2
)
. . . w1k ∼ N
(
wk, (λ · wk)2
)
w21 ∼ N
(
w1, (λ · w1)2
)
. . . w2k ∼ N
(
wk, (λ · wk)2
)
...
. . .
...
wm1 ∼ N
(
w1, (λ · w1)2
)
. . . wmk ∼ N
(
wk, (λ · wk)2
)
,
where λ ∈ R>0 is a user defined parameter controlling the amount of deviation from the
original weight wi, called relative deviation, and therefore N
(
wi, (λ · wi)2
)
is a normal
distribution with mean wi and variance (λ · wi)2.
3. Generate m new networks h1, h2, . . . , hm, the variations of h, where the weights of each
variation hi are w
i
1, w
i
2, . . . , w
i
k.
4. Feed x to h1, h2, . . . , hm, creating the outputs
h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hm(x).
5. Combine h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hm(x) to a single output y, for example by averaging or by
picking the majority vote.
6. Return y.
We point out that two parameters drastically affect the behavior of RPENN, namely the parameter
λ, determining the relative deviation and the parameter m, determining the number of variations
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to generate – the ensemble size. We refer to Section 6 for how these two parameters influence the
RPENN’s quality, efficacy, robustness and efficiency.
Note that choosingm = 1 disables the ensemble, and reveals one main difference between RPENN
and L+: The weight-individualGaussian distributions used to redraw the weights of the DNN variant.
Utilizing individual distributions like we did ensures that each weight is – relatively – perturbed by
the same amount, disregarding the fact that some weights might be orders of magnitude larger than
other weights. Using the same level of noise for all weights might on one hand substantially perturb
small weights, while on the other hand it might have negligible effects on large weights.
Briefly speaking: One important ingredient of RPENN is the usage of individual distributions and
the other one is the usage of an ensemble to leverage self-correcting behavior.
5 Experimental Methodology
In this section we justify our choice of the ImageNet data set and the VGG19 convolutional network,
we describe what preprocessing we applied, how we generated the considered adversarial examples,
how we selected the parameters of the defense mechanisms and how we estimated6 the quality, the
efficacy and the robustness of the assessed defense mechanisms.
Selection of Benchmark Data and Model To get realistic and relevant results, we chose to eval-
uate the defense mechanisms using the validation data set belonging to the ImageNet Deng et al.
[2009] Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge 2012 (ILSVRC 2012). That set contains 50000
color images and each picture has a resolution of 224 × 224, meaning that its resolution is sig-
nificantly higher than, for example, the resolution of the 28 × 28 gray scale images belonging
to the MNIST LeCun et al. [1998] data set. This choice is supported by Carlini and Wagner in
Carlini and Wagner [2017a], where they suggest evaluating defense mechanisms not just against
MNIST, but against CIFAR-10 or, even better, against ImageNet.
The DNN we used to benchmark the defense mechanisms is the VGG19 Simonyan and Zisserman
[2014] convolutional network, since it belongs in the ILSVR challenge 2014 to the best perform-
ing models, it represents a popular network structure (convolutional networks), is easily accessible
through the Keras Chollet et al. [2015] framework and has among those within Keras available net-
works the highest number of parameters (to find out if weight perturbing defense mechanisms are
applicable to networks of serious size).
Preprocessing: TheKeras implementation of the VGG19 network expects its input to be a channel
centered (see below) BGR7 image of size 224× 224. The validation data set of the ILSVRC 2012
did not meet these requirements, therefore we had to perform the following preprocessing steps to
every image:
1. convert the image to the BGR color space
2. uniformly scale the image, such that the smaller side of it has size 224
3. center-crop the image, such that it is square-shaped afterwards
4. subtract from every BGR-pixel the overall mean-BGR-pixel of VGG19’s training set:
[103.939, 116.779, 123.68]8 (this is what we call channel centering)9
Since center-croppingmight remove valuable information from the image changing the ground truth,
we discard in the next step every image which is not recognized correctly (in terms of top-1 clas-
sification) by VGG19. This has also the pleasant side effect of discarding all images not classified
correctly by VGG19 in the first place, avoiding to address those examples in later analyses. 35104
images remain after the discarding process, leaving, in our view, still a reasonably sized data set. For
the rest of this paper we will refer to this data set as D.
6 Since the defense mechanisms are randomized, we cannot determine their metrics with certainty; we can
only estimate them.
7 An RGB image where the blue and the red color channel is swapped.
8 This value is mentioned here: https://gist.github.com/ksimonyan/3785162f95cd2d5fee77#file-readme-md .
9 Note that this is neither the same as subtracting the mean-image (feature-wise centering) nor the same as
normalizing each image to have zero-mean (sample-wise centering).
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Table 1: Types and amounts of successfully generated adversarial examples.
Method # of AEs
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. [2014] 35100
Basic Iterative Method,∞-norm (BIMℓ∞ ) Kurakin et al. [2016] 35104
DeepFool Attack (DFA) Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016] 35095
Saliency Map Attack (SMA) Papernot et al. [2016a] 34508
L-BFGS Attack (L-BFGS) Szegedy et al. [2013] 35104
Carlini Wagner Attack, 2-norm (CWℓ2) Carlini and Wagner [2017b] 35104
Generating Adversarial Examples: Using the framework FoolBox Rauber et al. [2017] (in ver-
sion 1.6.1) written by Jones Rauber et al., we generated adversarial examples based on the data set
D for every adversarial example creating method listed in Table 1.
For every attack, the default settings given by FoolBox were used. That means the goal10 of each
attack was simply to cause VGG19 to misclassify the generated adversarial example, by means of
Top-1 classification and with respect to the ground truth of the corresponding benign image. This is
sometimes called untargeted misclassification.
Some of the methods failed to derive adversarial examples from some images in D, which is why
the numbers in the right column of table 1 are not always equal to 35104 – the full size of D.
Selecting the Defense Mechanism Parameters All considered defense mechanisms are param-
eterizable, where the parameter is σ in the case of the DMs L1, L* and L+ and for RPENN the
parameters are λ andm. To determine suitable values for σ, we first tried the values Gu and Rigazio
suggest in their paper, namely σ ∈ { 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 }. However, these settings led
to poor performance when used for VGG19 on ImageNet (Gu and Rigazio benchmarked small net-
works on MNIST) against CWℓ2 adversarial examples. We than tried 50 values linearly evenly
spaced across the range 0.01 to 10. This range turned out to give a good overview regarding the
quality and efficacy of L1. For L* and L+ however, that range was not suitable either (again poor
performance). We ended up using 50 geometrically evenly spaced values from the range 10−4 to
10−1, because here the peak of efficacy is in the center of the diagrams, as can be seen in Section 6.
We reused those ranges for the other attack methods.
The data suggested that probing values smaller than the lower bound, or larger than the upper bound
of the stated ranges makes no sense, as either the efficacy or the quality decreased considerably.
This is plausible when assuming that injecting less and less noise ultimately disables the effect of
the defense mechanisms. Conversely, by increasing the magnitude of the injected noise too much,
the input’s ground truth might change, or the network’s weights might become defective.
In a brief exploratory search for a suitable range for λ, we tested the search space
{ 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.24, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2, 3 }. We found that for λ > 0.5 the accuracy of
RPENN on benign input dropped down to non-justifiable level (less than 50% accuracy), while also
not performing well against adversarial input. Therefore we set the upper bound of the range of λ to
0.5 (yet we present in Section 6 only measurements where λ ≤ 0.33 due to layout reasons and poor
quality of RPENN for 0.33 ≤ λ ≤ 0.5). A second observation was that the step size of 0.01 is too
subtle, not providing additional insight. We concluded to half the search space even further to save
computation time, by using a step size of 0.02.
We chose the parameterm to grow exponentially, to cover sufficient ensemble sizes (trying to detect
if there’s a limit regarding the effect of further increasing the ensemble size), without consuming
too much computation time in contrast to, for example, reaching equally high values form by linear
growth. The parameter m is always uneven, to reduce the chance of ties if, for example, majority
vote is used to summarize the results of the variations.
To identify well performing combinations of λ andm, and to evaluate the efficacy of RPENN against
the various adversarial attacks, we performed an extensive search through product search space of
the components
10The goal is defined by the default FoolBox criterion »Misclassification«:
https://foolbox.readthedocs.io/en/latest/modules/criteria.html#foolbox.criteria.Misclassification
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Table 2: Defense mechanism parameter settings which lead to a high worst case efficacy among the
attack methods in Table 1, still serving a certain minimum quality. The notationQ(d) > x means in
this specific context the worst case quality of the considered DM among all discussed attack methods
in Table 1.
d Q(d) > 0.99 Q(d) > 0.98
L1 σ = 2.46 σ = 4.09
L* σ = 4.71 · 10−4 σ = 8.29 · 10−4
L+ σ = 4.71 · 10−4 σ = 8.29 · 10−4
RPENN (m = 1) λ = 0.03 λ = 0.05
RPENN (λ,m) = (0.05, 7) (λ,m) = (0.11, 63)
• all attack methods mentioned in Table 1
• λ ∈ { 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, . . . , 0.47, 0.49 }
• m ∈ { 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127 }
and recorded two values: E(RPENN) regarding the current attack method andQ(RPENN) regarding
the corresponding11 benign images.
Estimating Quality, Efficacy and Robustness We mentioned that we can only estimate the qual-
ity, efficacy and robustness of the studied defense mechanisms, because the randomization they uti-
lize affects these metrics. Regarding E(d) and Q(d) for d ∈ { L1,L*,L+ }, we recorded E(d) and
Q(d) for 10 different random seeds and averaged the respective measurements. The result is our es-
timate. Concerning the estimation of E(RPENN) and Q(RPENN) for high values ofm, we refused
repeating each measurement 10 times, with respect to the amount of computational resources needed
and also to the self-correcting nature of large ensembles. Thus we repeated the measurements only⌈
10
m
⌉
times, leading to generating at least 10 variations per combination, each with a fresh random
seed (taking into account them variations per combination). In our opinion, the average of the
⌈
10
m
⌉
measurements still suffices for being a representative estimation.
After having explored which settings lead to a good performance (for details see Section 6) in terms
of quality and efficacy, we selected for each DM two settings which promise to be a good overall
choice. One setting guarantees a minimum quality of 99% (among all considered attack meth-
ods) and simultaneously achieves a high worst case efficacy (also regarding all considered attack
methods). The second setting was selected regarding the same criteria, but for 98% quality. Table
2 shows settings meeting the mentioned criteria. We then recorded the robustness R(d, q, n) for
d ∈ { L1,L*,L+,RPENN (m = 1),RPENN }, for both configurations of Table 2 respectively, for
robustness levels q ∈ { 0.5, 0.8, 0.95, 0.99, 1 } and for n = 128 (each installation with a fresh ran-
dom seed). We chose these robustness levels since high values for q correspond to maximal damage
an attacker may cause.
Note that by definition the robustness metric itself sort of is an estimation of the true robustness
of a defense mechanism (which could be defined12 to be the expected value over all possible ran-
dom seeds). Choosing high values for n suffices to give a good estimate – further repetition is not
necessary.
6 Experimental Results
Quality and Efficacy: We see in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 (also in Appendix A), that as the
magnitude of noise increases (the absolute amount σ as well as the relative deviation λ), the quality
of all DMs decreases. The less noise is introduced, the better. To achieve satisfying results for
efficacy, one needs to find a sweet spot regarding the amount of noise to inject. If it is too small
or too high, the efficacy drops. Additionally, one has to trade-off efficacy with quality, since the
peak efficacy values are achieved at quality levels clearly below 100%. On average over all attack
methods (and if applicable also over the ensemble sizes), L1 reaches peak efficacy roughly at 94±
11 Benign images, where the generation method failed for to create an adversarial image, were omitted.
12We do not in this paper, because we see no benefit by doing so.
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2% quality; L+/L* reach it roughly at 91±5% quality; RPENNwithout ensemble reaches it roughly
at 93 ± 3% and RPENN with ensemble reaches it roughly at 96 ± 3%. So we can say that high
efficacy comes at the price of reduced quality. What loss of quality is acceptable depends, of course,
on the situation.
Robustness: In Figure 3 (and also in appendix B), where the robustness of the defense mech-
anisms against various attacks is shown, we see that as the number of installations n grows, the
proportion of AEs which successfully fool most or all out of of the n installations decreases clearly.
This indicates that randomness has a positive influence on this metric. For a non-random DM it
would make no difference to attack 1 out of 1 or n out of n – an adversarial example which over-
comes on installation would overcome all of them.
Comparing the Figures 3 and 6 directly with Figure 7, we see that we generally accomplish only a
minor gain in terms of additional robustness, if we trade in quality for more efficacy by selecting
DM settings from the right column of Table 2. Against most attacks (namely DFA, BIMℓ∞ , FGSM,
SMA and to some extent also CWℓ2 ), the more conservative settings from the left column of Table
2 suffice to attain desirable robustness. Only regarding the attack L-BFGS, or robustness levels
q ≤ 0.5 we think it’s worth considering less conservative settings to achieve more robustness.
Imagining the number of installations one might expect when a DNN is shipped via an App to smart-
phones, or as part of a cyber-physical system to autonomous cars, we rate the values for n, where
one already can see reasonable results, to be surprisingly low. However, since not all robustness
values reliably tend to 0, we expect there exist adversarial images, which seem to be quite immune
to the randomization introduced by the evaluation defense mechanisms.
Efficiency: In addition to analyzing DMs on quality, efficacy, and robustness, we also considered
whether they are efficient. Informally, we expect good defense mechanisms to only add a constant
overhead, where this constant is very small value. From this perspective, all the DMs seem very
good. More specifically, the resource consumption of L1 (both time and space) scales linear with
the input dimension, which is a constant. Hence, L1 introduces just constant overhead and a small
one at that. Both L+ and L* also introduce only a constant overhead. The overhead of RPENN
scales with network and ensemble size. However, given that the network size is fixed for a given
DNN and the ensemble size can also be fixed ahead of time, once again the overhead is a constant.
We didn’t perform detailed empirical analysis of the efficiency of these DMs, but our experience
with them suggests that the actual overhead we see in practice is a small constant. While RPENN is
slower than L1, L+, and L*, its running time is still tolerable for small to medium ensemble sizes.
For large ensemble sizes one has to use a more sophisticated implementation, where the variations
of the ensemble are not generated serially, like they are created in our reference implementation.
General Results: Surprisingly, the simplest of the considered defense mechanisms, namely L1,
seems according to our metrics to be the best overall defense mechanism. Only RPENN with a
large ensemble accomplishes similar efficacy and quality, but not as good robustness and clearly
worse efficiency. RPENN without ensemble is generally on par, or superior to L+ and L* and shows
a promising robustness behavior (even against L-BFGS). The similar performance of L* and L+
throughout all metrics we attribute to the fact, that the noise injected into the input and into the
hidden layers is controlled by the same parameter σ. We expect to see different behavior of L*, if
the noise injected to the hidden layer is controlled by another (and usually higher valued) parameter.
According to our metrics, the L-BFGS attack method is the strongest among the attacks (all consid-
ered DMs perform significantly worse against it than against all other attacks). The second strongest
attack is the CWℓ2 attack. The weakest attack is the BIMℓ∞attack.
7 Related Work
Jin, Dundar and Culurciello proposed in Jin et al. [2015] a training method called stochastic feed-
forward, involving randomized injection of Gaussian noise into the input layer and specific types of
hidden layers during the training process. On this point, they differ from the presented DMs, which
are applied to already trained networks (and are therefore easier to deploy).
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Figure 1: The estimated values of Q(RPENN) (left) and E(RPENN) (right) using various settings
for λ and m against DFA (top row), CWℓ2 (second row), BIMℓ∞ (third row) and L-BFGS (bottom
row). Note that the quality and efficacy values shown in the cells of the tables are rounded to 3
decimal places. A value of 1 just means an accuracy of greater than 99.5%. None of the shown
parameter settings lead to perfect quality.
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Figure 2: The quality and efficacy of L1 (first row) and L*/L+ (second/third row) against the attack
methods CWℓ2 , DFA, L-BFGS and BIMℓ∞ (columns). Notice the linear scale on the first row’s
x-axes, whereas the other two row’s x-axes scale logarithmically.
Liu et al. Liu et al. [2017] propose a technique they call Random Self-Ensemble, where they com-
bine randomness and ensembles (like RPENN). They insert noise layers into feed-forward networks
(which is like injecting noise into the network activations – not into the network weights) and retrain
it using a special procedure.
Perhaps the defense mechanisms that are closest to ours, are the ones proposed by Gu and
Rigazio Gu and Rigazio [2014], which we covered extensively in Section 4 and 6. The reason
we evaluate Gu and Rigazio’s work, but not Jin, Dundar and Culurciello’s work, as well as not the
work of Liu et al., is deployability. For this paper we focused on easily deployable DMs. Defense
mechanisms which require retraining, for example, are out of this paper’s scope.
Carlini andWagner propose in Carlini and Wagner [2017a] a methodology regarding how to evaluate
defense mechanisms against adversarial examples. We incorporate their work in this paper and
extend it regarding additional metrics.
8 Potential Threats to Validity
In this section, we examine several potential sources of weakness in the experimental evalu-
ation we conducted, following recommendation by the SIGPLAN committee on such experi-
ments Berger et al. [2018], and discuss ways in which we have attempted to minimize the impact of
these factors.
Chosen Data Set: The choice of data set can have significant impact on empirical evaluation of
DMs. We protect against this possible weakness by choosing a well-known, large, and compre-
hensive data set for our experiments: the ILSVRC2012 validation data set. We believe that, as a
consequence, our results are quite robust.
Attacker Model: Following the taxonomy given by Papernot et al. Papernot et al. [2016b], we
define a fairly precise attacker model. The attacker we consider is powerful and has white-box
access to the DNN under attack. The only limitation we place is that the attacker may not a priori
know the random seed used to randomize the considered DMs.
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Figure 3: The values of R(d, q, 128), for (d, q) ∈ { L1,L*,L+,RPENN (m = 1),RPENN } ×
{ 0.50, 0.80, 0.95, 0.99, 1.00 }, of all five defense mechanisms (rows) against the attack methods
CWℓ2 , DFA, L-BFGS and BIMℓ∞ (columns). The DMs are configured with the settings listed in
the column of Table 2 which is labeled with Q(d) > 0.99. To see a trend, intermediate values of
R(d, q, n) for n ∈ { 2, 4, . . . , 64 } are plotted too.
Experimental Methodology: We follow the experimental methodology suggested by Carlini and
Wagner Carlini and Wagner [2017a] for all our experimental evaluation, including using the Ima-
geNet data set as suggested by them. We further extend their methodology by defining a set of
properties and metrics for quality, efficacy, and robustness to characterize and differentiate good
defense mechanisms from bad ones.
Attacks Methods Considered: We tested our defense mechanism thoroughly over six different
and common gradient-based attack methods. We show that for all but one of these attack methods
(L-BFGS is the exception) the L1 and the RPENN defense mechanism perform reasonably well
according to our metrics. Having said that, it is possible that non gradient-based attack methods or
black-box attack methods (for example the method Papernot et al. suggest in Papernot et al. [2017])
succeed against these defense mechanisms.
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9 Conclusions
Adversarial attacks are a very important problem for machine learning in general. It is critical
that this problem be appropriately addressed to ensure continued adoption of reliable and secure
machine learning-based systems. In response to this problem, many researchers have proposed
defense mechanisms, both randomized and otherwise. However, to-date a robust methodology to
evaluate these DMs has been lacking. In our work, we proposed a comprehensive methodology and
a set of properties and metrics to evaluate DMs. An important part of our methodology is evaluating
the DMs on a real world size DNN (VGG19) and on a large and complex data set (ImageNet). While
this part seems obvious, so far it has not been adhered to by many researchers. Second, it is critical
that the DMs be tested against a variety of attack methods, including strong attacks like L-BFGS
and CWℓ2 . Once again, prior to our work we have not yet come across such robust testing. Finally,
it is critical to define a set of properties against which to evaluate and test DMs. We defined 4 such
properties, namely, efficacy, quality, robustness, and efficiency. (As this field develops further, we
expect more properties will be added to our list.)
Using the above-mentioned methodology, we tested 4 different DMs, namely, L1, L*, L+, and
RPENN. Two of these DMs (L+ and RPENN) are our novel contribution. Surprisingly and counter-
intuitively, our evaluation showed that L1 (where only the input is perturbed) performs the best in
terms of overall efficacy, quality, robustness, and efficiency. We expected that the perturbation of
the defended DNN and the usage of an ensemble would yield superior results.
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A Additional Data on Efficacy and Quality
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Figure 4: Estimated Q(RPENN) (left) and E(RPENN) (right) using various settings for λ and m.
The attack methods are FGSM (top) and SMA (bottom). We saw no reason for computing E and
Q for λ > 0.33 and m ∈ { 63, 127 }, since the data suggests to expect low quality and decreasing
efficacy in that region.
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Figure 5: The quality and efficacy of L1 (first row) and L*/L+ (second/third row) against the attack
methods FGSM and SMA (columns). Notice the linear scale on the first row’s x-axes, whereas the
other two row’s x-axes scale logarithmically.
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B Additional Data on Robustness
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Figure 6: The values of R(d, q, 128), for (d, q) ∈ { L1,L*,L+,RPENN (m = 1),RPENN } ×
{ 0.50, 0.80, 0.95, 0.99, 1.00 }, of all five defense mechanisms (rows) against the attack methods
FGSM and SMA (columns). The DMs are configured with the settings listed in the column of
Table 2 which is labeled with Q(d) > 0.99. To see a trend, intermediate values of R(d, q, n) for
n ∈ { 2, 4, . . . , 64 } are plotted too.
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Figure 7: The values of R(d, q, 128), for (d, q) ∈ { L1,L*,L+,RPENN (m = 1),RPENN } ×
{ 0.50, 0.80, 0.95, 0.99, 1.00 }, of all five defense mechanisms (rows) against the attack methods
CWℓ2 , DFA, L-BFGS, BIMℓ∞ , FGSM and SMA (columns). The DMs are configured with the set-
tings listed in the column of Table 2 which is labeled withQ(d) > 0.98. To see a trend, intermediate
values of R(d, q, n) for n ∈ { 2, 4, . . . , 64 } are plotted too. Note that, due to time limitations, the
robustness values for RPENN are only computed up to n = 64 instead of n = 128.
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